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Severe fires may damage process equipment or pipes, leading to accident escalation and domino effect. 
Several accidents that occurred in the chemical and petrochemical industry presented these features. In 
order to account for these accident scenarios in conventional Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) studies, 
the more critical step is the availability of reliable models to estimate the probability of escalation given the 
fire impact mode on industrial equipment. The present contribution was aimed at developing a 
methodological approach to the assessment of the damage probability of process and storage vessels, 
identified as escalation targets, with the final aim of quantifying the frequency of accidents triggered by 
domino effect and the implementation in QRA studies. Efforts were devoted to include in the analysis 
relevant site-specific factors and to consider the presence of eventual mitigation measures. The developed 
methodology was applied to a case study dealing with the escalation of a primary fire scenario. 
1. Introduction 
Domino effect was responsible of severe accidents that took place in the chemical and process industry 
(AIChE-CCPS, 2000) as demonstrated by past accident data analysis (Gòmez-Mares et al., 2008) and by 
specific studies (Cozzani et al., 2009). The more critical step in the quantitative assessment of domino 
hazards is the availability of reliable models to estimate the effects caused by the escalation of primary 
accidents (Khan and Abbasi, 2001).  
In particular, the damage probability of process and storage vessels involved in fires is often calculated by 
the use of arbitrary threshold values that do not take into account site-specific factors, as the possible 
mitigation due to passive and active protection systems or effective emergency response (Cozzani et al., 
2006). On the other hand, very complex and time consuming approaches are available for the detailed 
calculation of equipment resistance under the impact of a primary event, requiring a detailed description of 
vessel geometry and other design data (Manu et al., 2009). 
The present study was devoted to the analysis of domino effect scenarios involving accidental fires 
affecting process equipment by heat radiation. In this case, a lapse of time is interposed between the 
occurrence of the primary event, e.g. a steady source of thermal radiation, and the potential escalation due 
to the fire-induced failure of equipment. This time lapse, usually indicated as time to failure (Landucci et 
al., 2009a), is critical for the success of potential mitigation actions (Birk, 1988). A simplified approach was 
developed to the calculation of the damage probability of process vessels, aimed at the frequency 
estimation of domino accidents triggered by fire. The methodology was based on simplified correlations for 
the time to failure of vessels. These were obtained from an integrated approach, based on: i) the use of 
literature experimental data, ii) finite elements modelling (FEM) for complete thermal and mechanical 
simulations of the behaviour of vessels exposed to fires, iii) a lumped parameters model for vessel failure 
based on a thermal nodes approach. The analysis was aimed at evaluating the possible frequency of 
accidents for the implementation of domino effect in conventional Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). 
For this purpose, a case study was defined to test the methodology in actual industrial layouts, both 
considering pressurized and atmospheric equipment. 
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2. Methodology for the evaluation of damage probability 
2.1 Overview 
The precise evaluation of domino effect triggered by fire represents a complex task. In fact, the proper 
description and determination of several aspects characterizing fired domino effect, such as flame 
geometry, modes and severity of fire exposure condition and target equipment resistance to exposure 
actually arise several difficulties when problem simplification is attempted. A suitable approach could be 
the adoption of simplified correlations, based on “probit” functions, to evaluate the damage probability of 
process equipment. By means of probit vulnerability models, the escalation probability is calculated as the 
damage probability of target equipment, which is directly related to a “dose” amount of physical effect 
deriving from the impact vector. 
If the impact vector is represented by the heat load deriving from the primary fire, the failure of the target 
equipment may derive from the wall temperature increase and the consequent material weakening, and/or 
from the increase of internal pressure due to stored fluid heat up (Lees, 1996). This is a relatively slow 
process: hence, a significant time lapse exists between the primary fire start and the escalation occurrence 
(between 5 and 30 min, according to past accidents). Consequently, the evaluation of target equipment 
time to failure (ttf) is a fundamental parameter in the assessment of fired domino accidents. Probit 
vulnerability models based on the comparison of the target ttf and the characteristic time required for an 
effective mitigation (tem) were used for the escalation probability assessment. The analysis of protection 
systems effectiveness leading to tem estimation was performed by applying a LOPA (Layer Of Protection 
Analysis) approach and vulnerability models, also taking into account the mitigation measures 
implemented in the specific plant type and industrial site under analysis. 
2.2 Evaluation of process equipment resistance to fires 
The first step of the methodology was based on the use of sufficiently detailed models for the 
characterization of fired equipment behavior. For the present study, a model based on thermal nodes 
approach was developed. The main features of the model are described in the following, while more 
details can be found elsewhere (Landucci et al., 2009a). In the model, the physical quantities 
(temperature, pressure, thermal conductivity, density, etc.) were considered homogeneous within the 
defined wall region, in the liquid and vapour space. A sufficient number of thermal nodes were defined to 
describe the vessel wall and the stored substance and adopted in the thermal balance formulation. Figure 
1 shows the defined thermal nodes for the modelling of vessels coated with a layer of fireproofing material 
and full engulfment in the flames. The legend in Figure 1 shows the nodes definition. 
 
NODE DESCRIPTION
[1] Liquid space
[2] Vessels wall in contact with the liquid phase impinged by the flame
[3] Vessels wall in contact with the vapour phase impinged by the flame
[4] Insulated material layer (if present) at the level of the vapour phase in contact with the flame
[5] Insulated material layer (if present) at the level of the liquid phase in contact with the flame
[6] Vapour space.
[1] [6]
[3] [4]
[2] [5]
 
Figure 1: Nodes definition for a thermally insulated vessel adopted in the lumped parameters model for the 
time to failure estimation 
Although the lumped parameter model allowed a simple determination of temperature and pressure 
dynamic profiles, a local analysis of temperature distribution within vessel could not be obtained due to 
model limitations. Therefore, an exhaustive evaluation of thermal stresses within the structure due to heat 
radiation exposure was not possible. In order to validate the simplified assumptions that were made in the 
development of the lumped model, model simulation results were validated against those obtained by 
applying more complex physical models and against literature data. Particularly, a numerical code based 
on finite element modelling (FEM) was adopted to simulate in detail targets behaviour in severe fire 
exposure conditions and to obtain an extended dataset used for validation purposes. More information on 
FEM models are reported elsewhere (Landucci et al., 2009b). The results of validation procedure 
evidenced that the lumped parameter model allowed estimating conservative but credible ttf values, 
featuring an average error of 15 %. 
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2.3 Simplified correlation for the estimation of damage probability 
Even if the lumped model requires only a low computational time, its use in the analysis of extended and 
complex industrial areas, where a huge number of possible escalation targets triggered by fire may be 
identified, may require a relevant effort. In fact the model, although simplified, requires to define several 
input parameters for each simulation (e.g. vessel geometrical data, properties of vessel content, radiation 
mode, etc.). Thus, a further simplified tool to carry out a preliminary assessment of credible domino targets 
in a complex lay-out was identified in the adoption of simple analytical functions for the evaluation of 
vessel ttf. 
 
10
2
10
2
10
3
Heat flux (kW/m2)
Ti
m
e 
to
 fa
ilu
re
 (s
)
 
 
Volume=10 m3
Volume=50m3
Volume=100 m3
Volume=250 m3
10
2
10
2
10
3
Heat flux (kW/m2)
Ti
m
e 
to
 fa
ilu
re
 (s
)
 
 
Volume=25 m3
Volume=250 m3
Volume=2500 m3
Volume=17500 m3
a) b)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
x102
10 9876
x102
10 11 12
 
Figure 2: Results of lumped model simulations: time to failure (s) for atmospheric tanks (capacity from 25 
to 17500 m3) and pressurized vessels (capacity from 10 to 100 m3, design pressure 25 bar) plotted as a 
function of heat load (kW/m2). 
In order to define simple analytical functions, reference typologies of atmospheric tanks and pressurized 
vessels were considered according to specifications and operative data from existing industrial 
installations. The lumped parameter code was used to simulate several tanks types under different fire 
exposure conditions obtaining an extended data set of ttf values. Figure 2 shows an example of the ttf 
evaluated for atmospheric vessels exposed to distant source radiation (Figure 2a) and for pressurized 
vessels fully engulfed by the flame (Figure 2b). Different vessel capacities were analysed. 
Interpolating the extended data set obtained by lumped parameter model simulations allowed to determine 
simplified correlations for ttf evaluation as a function of heat load (I, kW/m2) and vessel volume (V, m3), 
considering different fire exposure conditions. The correlations have the following form: 
f)Iln(ecV)ttfln( d ++=  (1) 
Table 1 reports the coefficients for Eq. 1. 
Table 1: Summary of the coefficients to be used in Eq. 1 for the time to failure correlations applied in the 
present analysis  
Type of equipment Fire exposure condition Coefficients for Eq. 1 c d e f 
Pressurized vessel Flame engulfment 10.970 0.026 -1.29 0 
Pressurized vessel Distant source radiation 8.845 0.032 -0.95 0 
Atmospheric vessel Any -2.667×10-5 1 -1.13 9.877 
2.4 Implementation of fire protection barriers 
The proposed correlations led to conservative estimates of target time to failure without considering the 
mitigation due to protection systems and emergency measures. 
Active fire protection systems, such as automatically actuated sprinkler systems or water deluge systems, 
play an important role in firefighting efforts and significantly contribute to the tem value (accordingly to the 
previously presented definition). However, active fire protection system often feature a limited availability 
due to the possible delayed activation or the possible failure of critical component compromising the 
proper system functioning, often caused by the primary fire itself (Dennis and Nolan, 1996). Hence, in 
order to provide more reliable and robust safety barriers, passive fire protection systems are also adopted 
in storage (Di Padova et al., 2011), offshore (Tugnoli et al., 2012) and transport installations (Argenti and 
Landucci, 2014): in fact, passive protection systems do not require either power or external activation to 
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trigger the protection action. A typical example is represented by the combined adoption of emergency 
relief devices (Pressure Safety Valves) and fireproofing (Gomez et al., 2012) for pressurized vessels. 
Table 2: Thermal properties and maximum operative pressure TCmax for commercial coatings. 
Type of 
coating 
TCmax 
(K) 
Density
(kg/m3) 
Thermal 
conductivity 
(W/mk) 
Heat capacity  
(J/kgK) 
Ceramic fibers 1223-1473 192-208 0.066-0.163 1045 
Glass wool 473-773 10-100 0.03-0.07 1045 
Rock wool 923-1023 30-200 0.03-0.08 920 
 
Therefore, during the development of the methodology, a key issue was the implementation of passive 
protection systems in the evaluation of protected equipment time to failure. More specifically, passive 
protections allow delaying the failure of protected equipment with respect to the unprotected configuration. 
In the present analysis, the increased time to failure of protected equipment (identified in the following as 
ttfp) was obtained simply by adding the time to failure of the coating layer (ttfc) to the time to failure of the 
unprotected equipment item (ttf), according to the following expression: 
cp ttfttfttf +=  (2) 
In the case of fireproofing materials that are commonly adopted for industrial applications (in particular 
mineral wools), the value of ttfc was estimated on the basis of the maximum temperature reached by the 
material itself under fire exposure conditions. A maximum operative temperature (TCmax), above which the 
material loses almost completely its insulating properties, was defined for several typologies of fireproofing 
coatings. The selected values of TCmax together with the physical properties (Malloy, 1969) considered in 
this study are reported in Table 2. The ttfc was defined as the time at which the exposed surface of the 
fireproofing material reached the TCmax value. The study evidenced that a considerable delay in the target 
failure was induced by the presence of the PFP, providing extra time for the deployment of emergency 
teams and thus for the mitigation and suppression of the primary fire. 
2.5 Estimation of damage probability and domino frequency  
The present analysis highlighted that more the equipment is resistant to the fire, the less credible is 
escalation, since a higher time to failure allows longer time for fire protection systems activation and 
emergency team intervention. This is a peculiar aspect of domino effect induced by fire, in which a lapse of 
time is interposed between the primary fire and the escalation. This is not the case for other possible 
domino accident types, such as the ones triggered by fragments projection or overpressure, in which the 
escalation is almost simultaneous respect to the primary event. 
Thus, the probability of damage and escalation was related to the time to failure of the equipment, even in 
presence of thermal protection, comparing the ttfp (see Eq. 2) to the characteristic times required for 
successful mitigation (tem) (see Section 2.1). In the present study, two key times for emergency response 
were identified: the maximum time required to start the emergency operations (tem1) and the maximum 
time required to start the mitigation actions (tem2). In the absence of site specific data, tem1 was assumed 
of 5 min and tem2 was assumed of 20 min (Landucci et al., 2009a). Assuming a value of escalation 
probability equal to 0.1 (probit equal to 3.71) for ttfp equal to tem1 and equal to 0.9 (probit equal to 6.27) for 
ttfp equal to tem2, the following probit was applied in the present study to estimate escalation probability: 
)ttfln(857.125.9Pr p−=  (3) 
where the target equipment ttfp is expressed in minutes. Clearly enough, in absence of thermal protection 
ttfp = ttf in Eq. 3. Once the probit is evaluated, a value of escalation probability, univocally associated to the 
calculated probit, was also determined (see (Lees,1996) for probit into probability conversion).  
Finally, the frequency of occurrence of the secondary event triggered by fire can be evaluated as follows: 
iEfireiond Pff ,,,sec =  (4) 
where fsecond,i is the frequency of occurrence of the secondary accident involving the i-th equipment item of 
the layout, ffire is the frequency of occurrence of the primary fire triggering the domino chain and PE,i is the 
probability of escalation given the primary fire impacting on the i-th equipment item of the layout. 
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3. Application to a case study 
3.1 Definition of the case study 
With the aim of exemplifying the method developed, a case study was defined and analysed in order to 
determine the frequency of possible domino events triggered by fire. The layout of the case study, shown 
in Figure 3, consisted in a section of a storage tank farm including both atmospheric and pressurized 
storage tanks. The analysis dealt with the LOC event associated to the main connection failure of an 
acetone road tanker (T2, nominal capacity = 60 m3) in the unloading station, which was supposed to 
generate a pool fire. The expected frequency of the considered primary fire scenario was assumed equal 
to 2.5×10-7 y-1, according to literature sources (Uijt de Haag and Ale, 1999). Figure 3 also shows the iso-
radiation contours for the considered pool fire. Conventional literature integral models for consequence 
analysis (Lees, 1996) were applied considering uniform wind direction, stability class D and wind velocity 
equal to 5 m/s. The pressurized vessels storing chlorine (tanks P1, P2 and P3) were coated with a layer of 
rock wool. 
10020
T1
A2
50
T2 T3
A1
P3P1 P2
ID
Design 
pressure 
(barg)
Substance Diameter(m)
Height or 
Lenght (m)
Thickness 
(mm)
Insulating
coating
A1 A2 0.01 Toxic water solution 24 5.4 10.5 NO
P1 P2 
P3 19 Chlorine 3 18 24 YES
T1 T3 2 Water solution 2.6 15 16 NO
T2 2 Acetone 2.6 15 16 NO
 
Figure 3: Case study definition and features of the considered equipment. The map reports the iso-
radiation contours (bold black lines) expressed in kW/m2 associated to the primary pool fire 
3.2 Result and discussion 
As it can be seen from the layout depicted in Figure 3, all the vessels in the facility are potential domino 
targets. The atmospheric tanks A1 and A2 are fully engulfed by fire, while the pressurized vessels are 
exposed to distant radiation of decreasing intensity moving from P3 to P1. The road tankers T1 and T3 
were not considered in the analysis since they did not contain any hazardous materials. 
Table 3: Quantitative assessment of the probability and frequency of occurrence of final domino events  
Target 
ID 
Heat load 
(kW/m2) 
ttf 
(min) 
ttfc  
(min)
ttfp  
(min) 
Evaluated 
probit 
Escalation 
probability
Reference 
secondary event 
Secondary 
event frequency 
(y-1) 
A1 Flame 
Engulfmenta  
1.24 - - 8.849 9.999×10-1 Toxic dispersion 2.499×10-7 
A2 Flame 
engulfmenta 
1.24 - - 8.849 9.999×10-1 Toxic dispersion 2.499×10-7 
P1 30 19.76 15 34.76 2.660 9.648×10-3 Toxic dispersion 2.412×10-9 
P2 35 17.07 15 32.07 2.810 1.426×10-2 Toxic dispersion 3.565×10-9 
P3 48 12.64 15 27.64 3.086 2.779×10-2 Toxic dispersion 6.948×10-9 
a) In the case of flame engulfment, a heat load equal to 130 kW/m2 was considered. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the application of the presented methodology to each single target. On 
the basis of the heat load caused by the pool fire (see Figure 3), the ttf of uncoated equipment was 
estimated by applying the simplified correlations (see Eq.1 and Table 1 for the parameters).  
Next, the presence of the coating layer was taken into account for the estimation of the ttfp of vessels P1, 
P2 and P3 adding the ttfc contribution to the estimated ttf (see Eq. 2). In particular, a conservative value of 
ttfc (e.g. 15 min) was evaluated applying the lumped parameter code and simulating the time needed by 
the coating to reach the degradation temperature TCmax of 1000°C (see Table 2 for material properties). 
On the basis of ttfp, Eq. 3 was applied for probit calculation. Then the probit was converted into escalation 
probability (see (Lees, 1996) for more details). Finally, the frequency of occurrence of the final events was 
calculated through Eq. 4. The obtained results confirm that in case of severe fire exposure the escalation 
is credible leading to high values of escalation frequency. Hence, the evaluated accident propagation 
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trough the rupture of atmospheric tanks containing toxic material (A1 and A2) had the same order of 
magnitude of the primary pool fire, leading to amplification of the consequences and of the risk profile of 
the facility. Due to the inherent higher structural resistance and less severe fire exposure conditions, the 
accident propagation to the chlorine tanks (P1, P2 and P3) was less credible. In fact, the calculated 
escalation frequency is two orders of magnitude lower than the one of A1 and A2. Moreover, in this latter 
case, the presence of a heat resistant coating, even if with low protection performances (see Table 2), 
allowed increasing the ttfp value. 
4. Conclusions 
A methodological approach was developed for the frequency estimation of domino accidents triggered by 
fire. A detailed analysis of fired domino effect was presented to exemplify the procedure for escalation 
probability evaluation through the use of physical models for the estimation of the time to failure of 
equipment exposed to fire. Next, the model simulations were used to derive simplified correlations for ttf 
estimation and then escalation probability determination. In addition, the approach was extended to 
consider the effectiveness of passive fire protections in delaying equipment heat up and failure. A case-
study was defined to exemplify the methodology application. The results obtained evidenced on one side 
that severe fire scenarios have the potential to cause credible accident propagation and, on the other, that 
the mitigation action of PFP, aimed at delaying the time to failure of equipment exposed to fire, significantly 
contribute to the reduction of domino effect frequencies.  
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